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FreeIPA PKI: current plans and a future vision

FreeIPA’s X.509 PKI features (based on Dogtag Certificate System) continue to be an area of interest for users and customers. In this post I summarise recently-added PKI features in FreeIPA, work in progress, and what we plan to do in future releases. Then I will outline my personal vision for what the future of PKI in FreeIPA should look like, noting how it will address pain points and limitations of the existing architecture.

Recent changes and work in progress §

In the past only a single certificate profile was supported (appropriate for TLS-enabled services) but as of FreeIPA 4.2 multiple certificate profiles are supported (including custom profiles), as are user certificates. CA ACL rules define which profiles can be used to issue certificates to particular principals (users, groups, hosts, hostgroups and/or services). The FreeIPA framework (not Dogtag) enforces CA ACLs.

Custom profiles support means that the PKI can be used for a huge number of use cases, but it is still up to the user or operator to provide a suitable PKCS #10 certificate signing request (CSR).

I am currently working on implementing support for lightweight sub-CAs in Dogtag and FreeIPA so that sub-CAs can be easily created and used to issue certificates. The CA ACLs concept will be extended to include sub-CAs so that use of certain profiles can be restricted to particular CAs.

Problems with the current architecture §

To put this this all in context, please study the following crappy diagram of the current FreeIPA PKI architecture:

|   User   |
|          |  1. Generate CSR
| +------+ |     (somehow... poor user)
| | krb5 | |
| |ticket| |
     |                           +-----------+
     | 2. ipa cert-request       |           |
     |    (CSR payload)          |   389DS   |
     v                           |           |
+--------------------+           +-----------+
|  FreeIPA   +-------+                 ^
|            |krb5   |                 |
|            |proxy  <-----------------+
| +-------+  |ticket |   3. Validate CSR
| |RA cert|  +-------+   4. Enforce CA ACLs
      | 5. Dogtag cert request
      |    (CSR payload)
| Dogtag | 6. Issue certificate

The Dogtag CA is the entity that actually issues certificates. FreeIPA requests certificates from Dogtag with the RA Agent credential (an X.509 client certificate) with which the FreeIPA framework has authority to use any profile that accepts RA Agent authentication to issue a certificate. This is a longstanding violation of an important framework design principle: the framework should only ever operate with the privileges of the authenticated principal.

Another problem is that users are burdened with the responsibility of crafting a CSR that is correct for the profile that will be used. This is a nontrivial task even for common types of certificates - it is downright painful once exotic extensions come into play. There is a lot that a user can get wrong, which may result in an invalid CSR or cause Dogtag to reject a request because it does not contain the data required by the profile. Furthermore it is reasonable to expect that any data that appear on a certificate are (or could be) stored in the directory, and could be populated into a certificate automatically according to the profile rather than by copying the data from the CSR.

On the topic of exotic extensions: although FreeIPA ensures that requested extension values of common extensions are appropriate and correspond to the subject principal’s attributes (e.g. making sure that all Subject Alternative Names are valid), no validation of uncommon extensions is performed. Nor should it be - not in the FreeIPA framework, especially; the complexity of validating extension values does not belong here, and validation is impossible if we have not yet taught FreeIPA about the extension or how to validate it, or if the validation involves custom LDAP schema. This is the problem we have with the IECUserRoles extension which we support with a profile but cannot validate - user self-service must be prohibited for profiles like this and certificate administrators must be trusted to only issue certificates with appropriate extension values.

Planned work to address (some of) these issues §

The framework privilege separation (lack thereof) issue is tracked in FreeIPA ticket #5011: [RFE] Forward CA requests to Dogtag or helper by GSSAPI. This will remove the RA Agent credential and CA ACL enforcement logic from FreeIPA. Instead, the framework will obtain a proxy ticket to talk to Dogtag on behalf of the requestor principal, and Dogtag will authenticate the user, consult CA ACLs and (if all is well) continue with the certificate issuance process (which could still fail if the data in the CSR does not satisfy the profile requirements).

Implementation details for this ticket are not yet worked out but it will involve creating a service principal for Dogtag and giving Dogtag access to a keytab, performing GSSAPI authentication (probably in a Java servlet realm implementation) and providing a new profile authorisation class to read and enforce CA ACLs. Tomcat configuration and FreeIPA profile configurations will have to be updated (during upgrade) to use the new classes.

Ticket #4899: [RFE] mechanism to map principal info into certificate requests was filed to improve user experience when creating CSRs for a particular profile. An openssl req configuration file template could be stored for each profile and a command added to fill out the template and return the appropriate config for a given user, host or service. We could go further and supply config templates for other programs, or even create the whole CSR at once. Or even make it part of the cert-request command, bypassing a number of steps! The point is that there is currently a lot of busy-work around requesting certificates that is not necessary, and we can save all certificate users time and pain by improving the process.

With these enhancements, the architecture diagram changes to remove the RA certificate and provide assistance to the user in generating the CSR (which is abstracted as the user reading data from 389DS):

|   User   | 1a. Read CSR template / attributes
|          |<--------------------------+
| +------+ |                           |
| | krb5 | |                           |
| |ticket| | 1b. Generate CSR          |
+-+--|---+-+                           |
     |                                 |
     | 2. ipa cert-request             |
     |    (CSR payload)                |
     v                                 |
+-----------+                          |
|  FreeIPA  |                          |
|           |                    +-----------+
|    +------+                    |           |
|    |krb5  |  3. Validate CSR   |   389DS   |
|    |proxy <------------------->|           |
|    |ticket|                    +-----------+
+----+--|---+                          ^
        |                              |
        | 4. Dogtag cert request       |
        |    (CSR payload)             |
        v                              |
+--------------------+                 |
|  Dogtag    +-------+                 |
|            |krb5   |                 |
|            |proxy  <-----------------+
|            |ticket |    5. Enforce CA ACLs
|            +-------+
  6. Issue certificate

Future of FreeIPA PKI: my vision §

There are still a number of issues that the improved architecture does not address. The data in CSRs still have to be just right. There is no way to validate exotic or unknown extension data, limiting use cases or restricting user self-service and burdening certificate issuers with the responsiblity of getting it right. There is no way to pull data from custom LDAP schema into certificates or even to automatically include data that we know is in the directory on certificates (e.g. email, KRB5PrincipalName or other kinds of alternative names).

The central concept of my vision for the future of FreeIPA’s PKI is that Dogtag should read from LDAP all the data it needs to produce a certificate according to the nominated profile (except for the subject public key which must be supplied by the requestor). This relieves the FreeIPA framework and Dogtag of most validation requirements, because we would ignore all data submitted except for the subject public key, subject principal, requestor principal and profile ID (CA ACLs would still need to be enforced).

In this architecture the PKCS #10 CSR devolves to a glorified public key format. In fact the planned CSR template feature is completely subsumed! We would undoubtedly continue to support PKCS #10 CSRs, and it would make sense to continue validating aspects of the CSR to catch obvious user errors; but this would be a UX nicety, not an essential security check.

The architecture sketch now becomes:

|   User   |
|          | 1. Generate keypair
| +------+ |
| | krb5 | |
| |ticket| |
     | 2. ipa cert-request
     |    (PUBKEY payload)
|   FreeIPA    |
|              |                 +-----------+
| +----------+ |                 |           |
| |krb5 proxy| |                 |   389DS   |
| |  ticket  | |                 |           |
+-+----|-----+-+                 +-----------+
       |                               ^
       | 3. Dogtag cert request        |
       |    (PUBKEY payload)           |
       v                               |
+--------------------+                 |
|  Dogtag    +-------+                 |
|            |krb5   |                 |
|            |proxy  <-----------------+
|            |ticket |    4. Enforce CA ACLs
|            +-------+    5. Read data to be included on cert
  6. Issue certificate

Consider the IECUserRoles example under this new architecture and observe the following advantages:

In terms of implementation, over and above what was already planned this architecture will require several new Dogtag profile policy modules to be implemented, and these will be more complex (e.g. they will read data from LDAP). Pleasantly, these do not actually have to be implemented in or be formally a part of Dogtag - we can write, maintain and ship these Java classes as part of FreeIPA and easily configure Dogtag to use them.

In return we can remove a lot of validation logic from FreeIPA and profile configurations will be easier to write and understand (decide which extensions you want and trust the corresponding profile policy class to “do the right thing”).

Importantly, it becomes possible for administrators to provide their own profile components implementing the relevant Java interface that read custom schema into esoteric or custom X.509 extensions, supporting any use case that we (the FreeIPA developers) don’t know about or can’t justify the effort to implement. Although this is technically possible today, moving to this approach in FreeIPA will simplify the process and provide significant prior art and expertise to help users or customers who want to do this.

Concluding thoughts §

There are plans for other FreeIPA PKI features that I have not mentioned in this post, such as Let’s Encrypt / ACME support, or an interactive “profile builder” feature. The proposed architecture changes do not directly impact these features although simplifying profile configuration in any way would make the profile builder a more worthwhile / tractable feature.

The vision I have outlined here is my own at this point - although I have hinted at it over the past few months this post is my first real effort to expound and promote it. It is a significant shift from how we are currently doing things and will be a substantial amount of work but I hope that people will see the value in reducing user and administrator workload and being able to support new X.509 use cases without significant ongoing effort by the FreeIPA or Dogtag development teams.

Feedback on my proposal is strongly encouraged! You can leave comments here, send an email to me (ftweedal@redhat.com) or the FreeIPA development mailing list (freeipa-devel@lists.fedorahosted.org) or continue the discussion on IRC (#freeipa on Libera.Chat).

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